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CONTRACTS  
I. SUMMARY 
 The Second Judicial District Court entered an order compelling arbitration in a 
construction defect dispute. Petitioners asked for a writ of mandamus vacating the order 
compelling arbitration.  
II. DISPOSITION/OUTCOME 
 The Nevada Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus because the arbitration 
provisions of the contract were unconscionable.  
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Donald and Linda Gonski signed a purchase agreement for a single residence from Pulte 
Homes in April of 2004. At the time of the singing, Pulte presented the Gonskis with a stack of 
forms amounting to 469 pages and told the Gonskis that others were willing to step in and buy 
the home if they did not sign all the documents at that time. The Gonskis signed.  
Months after, the Gonskis served Pulte Homes with a NRS Chapter 40 notice of 
construction defects, and the parties mediated the matter.  Mediation did not prove fruitful, so the 
Gonskis brought suit in district court.  Pulte Homes moved to compel arbitration based on the 
arbitration clause of the purchase agreement.  The Gonskis opposed, stating there was an 
additional arbitration clause under the separate limited warranty that applied to construction 
defects, and claiming that the arbitration clauses under both the purchase agreement and the 
limited warranty were unconscionable and unenforceable.  
 The purchase agreement arbitration clause stated the following: 
  ARBITRATION: Any controversy, claim or dispute 
arising out of or relating to this Agreement or Your purchase of the 
Home (other than claims under the Limited Warranty) shall be 
settled by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry 
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) 
and the Federal Arbitration Act (Title 9 of the United States Code) 
and judgment rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be confirmed, 
entered and enforced in any court having jurisdiction. As a 
condition precedent to arbitration, the dispute shall first be 
mediated in accordance with the Construction Industry Mediation 
Rules of the AAA, or such other mediation service selected by Us. 
Claims under the Limited Warranty will be arbitrated in 
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accordance with the arbitration provision set forth in the Limited 
Warranty. 
In the event the claim relates to a construction defect, the 
construction dispute provisions (including good-faith mediation) of 
Chapter 40 of Nevada Revised Statutes shall also apply if and to 
the extent that the alleged defect is covered by the Limited 
Warranty. 
  
The additional arbitration clause contained within the limited warranty stated the 
following: 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
This Dispute Settlement provision sets forth the exclusive 
remedy of all disputes or controversies under this LIMITED 
WARRANTY. 
. . . . 
If the Plan Administrator is unable to successfully mediate 
the dispute, the Plan Administrator will inform THE HOMEOWNER 
and THE BUILDER that the dispute is unresolved and that Binding 
Arbitration is provided as a remedy for resolving the dispute. 
. . . . 
Any binding arbitration proceeding will be conducted 
pursuant to the United States Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) 
(“the Act”) by an independent, nationally recognized, arbitration 
organization designated by the Plan Administrator.  The rules and 
procedures followed will be those under the Act, which may be 
supplemented by the arbitration organization’s rules.  A copy of 
the applicable rules and procedures will be delivered to you upon 
your request to the Plan Administrator. 
The arbitration will determine THE HOMEOWNER’s, THE 
BUILDER’s and (if applicable) the Insurer’s rights and obligations 
under this LIMITED WARRANTY.  These rights and obligations 
include, but are not limited to, those provided to THE HOMEOWNER 
or THE BUILDER by local, state or federal statutes in connection with 
this LIMITED WARRANTY.  The award of the arbitrator(s) will be final, 
binding and enforceable as to THE HOMEOWNER, THE BUILDER and (if 
applicable) the Insurer, except as modified or vacated in 
accordance with the Act or the arbitration organization’s rules.  A 
judgment rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be confirmed, entered 
and enforced in any court having jurisdiction. 
 
 The Gonskis argued that both provisions were unconscionable and, therefore, 
unenforceable.  In addition, they asserted that they did not have enough time to review the 
documents in full and that the documents were not adequately explained to them.  The district 
court ruled that the arbitration clauses were not unconscionable and ordered the parties to 
participate in arbitration.  The Gonskis then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to the Nevada 
Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court case was heard by a panel of three justices; Justice Douglas 
wrote the opinion with Justice Hardesty concurring. Justice Pickering concurred in part and 
dissented in part.  
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 The Gonskis argued that the arbitration clauses in both agreements were unconscionable 
and made the clauses unenforceable. The Court will not uphold an arbitration agreement if it 
finds the agreement both procedurally and substantively unconscionable..
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  Both types of 
unconscionability are required to make an agreement unenforceable, but Justice Douglas referred 
to a California case that reasons “the stronger the showing of substantive unconscionability, the 
less necessary is a strong showing of procedural unconscionability,” and vice versa.3   
Procedural Unconscionability 
 Procedural unconscionability arises when a party has no “meaningful opportunity to 
agree to the clause terms either because of unequal bargaining power, as in an adhesion contract, 
or because the clause and its effects are not readily ascertainable upon a review of the contract.”4 
 The Nevada Supreme Court previously stated that “to be enforceable, an arbitration 
clause must at least be conspicuous and clearly put a purchaser on notice that he or she is 
waiving important rights under Nevada law.”5  Regarding the Pulte arbitration agreement, the 
Court said that it “in no way draws the reader’s attention.”  The agreement was towards the end 
of an eighteen-page document and had no kind of formatting differences from the paragraphs 
around it, even though some other paragraphs in the document were given more attention 
through using all capital letters and bolding.  
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 In addition, the arbitration agreement under the limited warranty was given to the 
Gonskis with a large stack of other documents and was slightly different from the agreement 
under the purchase contract.  Consequently, the Court said the second agreement caused the 
Gonskis to forfeit specific rights without knowing it.  The Court stated that although the 
violations were not great, procedural unconscionability was present.  
Substantive Unconscionability 
 Substantive unconscionability is based on the one-sidedness of the arbitration terms and 
consists of terms that are oppressive.
6
  In the present case the Court found two occurrences of 
substantive unconscionability:  one with the disclaiming of arbitration expenses and the other 
with the disregard of NRS Chapter 40 rights.  
Arbitration Expenses 
 The Court held that the conflict between the arbitration clauses in the purchase agreement 
and the limited warranty agreement, taken together with the one-sidedness of the clause in the 
limited warranty agreement constituted substantive unconscionability.  In the purchase 
agreement, the clause stated that Pulte Homes would advance the fees necessary for the 
arbitration.  The Court said that this seemed to apply to any arbitration case between the parties.  
However, in the limited warranty agreement, the clause stated that the purchaser must pay the 
fees up front.  This burden, along with the conflicting language in the clauses, constituted 
substantive unconscionability.  
NRS Chapter 40 Rights 
 NRS Chapter 40 was enacted to protect the rights of homebuyers, and, in contrast to 
common law, allowed homeowners to bring negligence claims against contractors for 
construction defects.  The Court here held that contractor’s may not “limit a homeowner’s 
recovery to defects covered by contract or warranty.”  Doing so would defeat the public 
policy of the state that created by Chapter 40.  
In the current instance, Pulte Homes tried to limit its liability by using the limited 
warranty agreement.  Thus, the provision tried to limit Chapter 40 rights and was, therefore, 
substantively unconscionable. The court said that the denial of these rights constituted 
“significant substantive unconscionability.” 
V. OPINION CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART 
 In her opinion, Justice Pickering concurred that the writ of mandamus should be issued 
overturning the district court’s order; however, Justice Pickering expressed her feelings that 
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under the recent U.S. Supreme Court case Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson
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 case, the 
Gonskis’ case should have been remanded to the district court for further arguments regarding 
whether the agreements contained an enforceable delegation clause.  If so, Justice Pickering 
reasoned that an arbitrator should be the one who determines if the arbitrator or the district court 
should hear the case.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 Despite the slight procedural unconscionability, the contracts’ strong substantive 
unconscionability due to the disregard of NRS Chapter 40 rights created sufficient reason to 
invalidate the arbitration clauses altogether.  
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